Enterprise creation & anti-commons in developing economies: evidence from World Bank doing business data by Driouchi, Ahmed & Malki, Karim
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Enterprise creation & anti-commons in
developing economies: evidence from
World Bank doing business data
Ahmed Driouchi and Karim Malki
IEAPS, Al Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco
16. April 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32373/
MPRA Paper No. 32373, posted 22. July 2011 12:10 UTC
Enterprise Creation & Anti-commons in Developing Economies: 
Evidence from World Bank Doing Business Data 
 
By:  
Ahmed Driouchi
1
 
Institute of Economic Analysis & Prospective Studies (IEAPS),  
Al Akhawayn University, Ifrane (AUI), Morocco, 
A.Driouchi@aui.ma 
Karim Malki 
Institute of Economic Analysis & Prospective Studies (IEAPS),  
Al Akhawayn University, Ifrane (AUI), Morocco, 
K.Malki@aui.ma 
 
April, 2011 
 
Abstract: This paper looks at the tragedy of anti-commons and its implications on enterprise 
creation in developing economies. The most important features of the anti-commons are captured 
under a simplified theoretical economic model. The empirical part uses the data from “Doing 
Business” of the World Bank, to test for the high costs implied by scattered and fragmented 
decisions related to enterprise creation in developing economies. The attained results show the 
prevalence of anti-commons in relation to the development of new enterprises in developing 
economies relative to more developed countries. This points out how anti-commons can limit 
development and market economies through reducing business and enterprise creation and 
expansion. Awareness and development of appropriate remedies to anti-commons are among the 
means to ensure higher economic and social achievements.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Economics, as other sciences, has also been referring to the pool of knowledge and expertise 
scattered among different poorly connected decision making public and private agents. This is 
the situation of “anti-commons” with resources utilized in a sub-optimal and inefficient way. As 
a result, development policies and private business promotion can fail to gather all the necessary 
information, knowledge, resources, and capital. This diminishes the chances of success, leading 
to the tragedy of anti-commons and thus to the failure to contribute to the promotion of new 
economic and social opportunities (Heller 1998; Kelly & Michelman 1980, Buchanan & Yoon, 
2000).While in commons pool open access resources, no actor has the right to exclude another 
until full depletion of the resource, the anti-commons is the reverse as too many have the right to 
exclude (Aoki 1998) creating thus the tragedy of anti-commons that is total under-use of the 
resource with the prevalence of higher access prices and higher costs of entry. 
Economic and social policies in the developing world are today increasingly required to benefit 
optimally from coordinated actions in all areas and sectors. This includes also the bilateral and 
world relations besides the development of businesses and enterprise creation.  
The needed policies necessitate the collaboration of an overlapping web of government bodies 
and private partners that control the relevant knowledge and expertise relative to each policy 
dimension. Besides that, new and diversified sets of inputs that are informational, technological 
and institutional are continuously needed. The outcomes of policies and actions in developing 
countries are expected to be penalized by the scattering of expertise, more than it would be in the 
case of the developed world.  
The general literature shows that these failures can be related to factors such as bureaucracy, 
institutional rigidity, and weak coordination channels besides the limited levels of transparency 
and lack of updated knowledge. The economic literature emphasizes that the tasks of gathering 
the required inputs are time consuming leading most of the time to higher number of transactions 
and thus to higher individual and social costs.  
The objective of this paper is to show how anti-commons can be revealed to contribute implicitly 
to blocking economic and social development through limiting enterprise creation. A focus is 
placed on the first step leading to enterprise creation and business development in the context of 
developing economies.   
This is achieved in four major steps. The first one is a literature review while the second focuses 
on a simplified theoretical model that is used as the basis for the empirical tests. The third section 
is empirical and based on analyzing “Doing Business World Bank data” in relation to enterprise 
creation. The last section is a discussion of the results attained.  
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review is intended to showing how anti-commons are pervasive and do affect the 
performance of economic and social projects.  
The tragedy of commons as a concept made popular by the Hardin (1968). The tragedy he refers 
to emerges upon the overuse of an open access and use of a common resource. Other 
publications on commons were by Ostrom (1990) with the introduction of series of cases. In 
these studies, communities have developed many institutional arrangements to durably manage 
common pool resources with more or less success in preventing resource exhaustion. These 
findings have shown the complexities of real world commons. Furthermore, issues related to 
specificities of some commons as introduced in Ostrom (1990) and explained in Bergstrom 
(2010). The link with private ownership and exclusion are also developed (Ostrom & Schlager, 
2010).  
But, the symmetrical image of commons developed by Heller (1998) as the tragedy of anti-
commons with resource underused and exclusion rights added to usage rights. Thus, an anti-
common situation occurs when more than one user of a resource are endowed with the right to 
exclude others from its usage, with none of them having a full privilege of use unless authorized 
by all the others. The result is the suboptimal utilization of the resource and or even its idleness 
in extreme cases. All the agents in this case are said to act under individualistic competition and 
exclusion rights. Veto powers are likely to be exercised even when the use of the resource by one 
agent can yield a generalized social benefit (Coelho et. al, 2009). Buchanan & Yoon (2000) 
suggest that the tragedy of anti-commons be measured in terms of the non-realized economic 
value due the under-use of the resource and that the size of such forgone opportunity is 
proportional to the number of exclusion right-holders involved. The keyword here is obviously 
the inefficiency imposed by each exclusion right holder on the others and thus on society in 
general. Accordingly, commons and anti-commons are symmetrical in the sense that for both 
situations, agents reduce each others rents (including themselves) with resource depletion on the 
long run (tragedy of the commons) or with maintaining the resource idle (tragedy of anti-
commons) (Buchanan & Yoon, 2000).  
Parisi and Schultz (2003) explain that understanding the working of either commons or anti-
commons requires a departure from the intuitive comparison with unified property as in 
commons and anti-commons with unclear limits between rights of use and rights of exclusion. In 
the case of commons, the right of use is more emphasized than the right to exclude. In the case of 
anti-commons however, the right to use is eclipsed by the exclusion rights held by all other co-
owners. Moreover, both commons and anti-commons situations imply some extent of forgone 
synergies between the co-owners. That is how the authors reach the conclusion that commons 
and anti-commons are characterized by a discrepancy between usage and exclusion rights and 
that the final result is a misalignment between private and social incentives of the various 
owners.  
Parisi and Schultz (2003) go further in their explanation of anti-commons by underlining that the 
latter induce static and dynamic externalities. The static externalities result from the current 
exercise of a right of exclusion by one owner which nullifies the value of the similar rights held 
 4 
by others. Dynamic externalities occur throughout time and are due to the under-use of the 
productive assets in the present, implying future penalties.  
An insightful parallelism can be drawn between Parisi and Schultz (2003) in relation to the 
distinction between sequential and simultaneous anti-commons and the distinction between 
hierarchical and polyarchical types of decision-making architectures. Such convergence between 
the economics of property and the economics of decision-making helps broadening the 
understanding of how the tragedy of anti-commons can emerge in spheres other than physical 
property. It is exactly the logic followed by Buchanan and Yoon (2000) who extend the concept 
to stand for an analytical framework applied to the study of the disparate and overlapping 
institutional structures. In this sense, the authors state that the tragedy of anti-commons captures 
the inefficiencies of overlapping bureaucracies. For instance, an entrepreneur has often to 
overcome series of obstacles embodied in different permits issued by different authorities that 
hold specific veto and hence, exclusion rights. The fragmented resource is here the authority and 
executive power held by multiple agencies and fragmented following an anti-common model. 
Depoorter and Vanneste (2004) referred to the risks related to the excessive propertization in the 
context of “anti-commons” property regimes. The authors looked at the deadweight losses in 
relation to the complementarily between ownership and fragmentation.  
 
After the elicitation of anti-commons problems by Heller (1998), many cases related mainly to 
patenting started rising from both developed and developing countries. For example, Velho 
(2004) underlines that cooperation is vital for developing countries to access technology and 
research. This is due to the control that developed countries have on the technology and research 
in the crucial fields of heath and agriculture. Following the Bayh-Dole act in 1980
2
, a massive 
patenting campaign, issued by US universities and non-profit institutions, has taken place. A 
study by Graff et al. (2003) emphasizes that 2.5% of patents in all fields of technology, are 
owned by the US public sector. In the agricultural field, this percentage is 25%. In the health 
sector, Kapczynski et al. (2003) state that major patents needed for HIV treatment are held by 
Yale University, University of Minnesota, Emory University and Duke University. This 
patenting wave from Bayh-Dole, has helped clarify the ownership of intellectual properties and 
technologies. However its implementation has been raising issues of fragmentation with risks of 
tragedies of anti-commons. 
Economic and social development problems require coordination of the contributions of many 
scattered operators from public, private, national and international economies. But, most of the 
time, transactions costs are high with further restriction of information implying limited 
implementation. Anti-commons with scattered operators and fragmented sources of information 
have difficulty providing timely knowledge to potential users. Under this situation, private and 
public actions can be blocked because of lack of information and the higher cost of project 
realization.  
                                                 
2
 See : Bayh-Dole Act, Pub.L. No. 96-517, 98 Stat. 3015 (1980) (The Patent and Trademark Act of 1980) 
(amendments included in Pub.L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335 (1984)). 
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While information is diffused and used rapidly in the context of developed economies, it is not 
often the case in developing economies, as further steps are needed to spread the knowledge and 
have different economic agents and households access it and implement it. This information gap 
increases with the degree of integration characterizing the piece of knowledge. The health issues 
in relation to the effects of nutrition on non communicable diseases have not all the time been 
considered in a large number of developing economies. While obesity is an issue for developing 
economies, it is not yet perceived as such in most of these countries. The need for both larger 
domestic and foreign investments has not been coupled with health and environmental standards. 
In these circumstances, private firms are still and have been expanding in areas of fast food, 
sweeties and related products. This shows that both the enlargement of investments and of 
consumer choices is progressively becoming harmful illusions in the developing world. 
Besides the above evidence, there are other immaterial examples leading also to economic and 
social failures. The creation of new enterprises goes through a licensing and series of 
authorizations that relate to the different stages needed for launching a business. The initial can 
be crucial in case of largely fragmented authorizing agencies.  
 
The most important contribution in this area is provided by Qianwei and Guangnan (2007). In 
this paper, the authors investigate how the fragmentation of licensing rights affects the 
occurrence of the tragedy of anti-commons in the enterprise licensing procedures. It is also 
shown that the impacts of the tragedy of the anti-commons are more emphasized with the high 
extent of fragmentation. This situation alters the evolution of the entrepreneurial initiatives and 
creates considerable challenges for the victims of the anti-commons (enterprise creation).  
 
Dethier and al., (2008) survey the recent literature which examines the impact of the business 
climate on productivity and growth in developing countries using enterprise surveys. Various 
infrastructure, finance, security, competition, and regulation variables have been shown to have a 
significant impact on enterprise performance.  
Scharff (2006) in condemning the anti-commons found that economic development of land may 
be suboptimal where multiple parties have the legal right to exclude use of the property in 
question.  
 
But some authors referred to the links between bureaucracy, corruption and economic 
performance before the pioneering works on anti-commons. These include Quah (1982). This 
latter author provides some examples such as import-export licenses and the underassessment of 
income tax.  
 
The empirical evidence introduced here concern respectively the general trends taking place in 
both technological, institutional innovations and the related economic policies pursued by series 
of developing countries. While economies should develop further awareness about the negative 
effects of anti-commons and related tragedies, they are invited to the strengthening of the 
knowledge base and the economic foundations that sustain different policy shifts and reforms, 
especially when accounting for access to promising technologies.  
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II. A THEORETICAL ECONOMIC MODEL OF ANTI-COMMONS 
Following the simplified model developed by Canavese (2004), and in order to account for anti-
commons, different market structures are attempted under the hypothesis of a linear aggregate 
inverse demand function for the good or service (Y) where p and Y refer respectively to price 
and quantity. The inverse demand schedule is given by .α β= −p Y where α is the intercept and 
β a positive coefficient. Profit maximization is also assumed under zero costs of production. The 
first order conditions for profit maximization are necessary and sufficient (given by pi’=0) under 
this simplified model, lead to optimal prices p* and quantities Y* that solve the profit 
maximization problem under each market structure. This is undertaken respectively for perfectly 
competitive, monopolist, duopolist and oligopolist markets with focus on anti-commons (large 
number of agents). The reason for considering different market structures with an increasing 
number of agents resides in the willingness to set a theoretical basis to show that anti-commons 
lead to lower quantities with higher prices. The sub-indices 1, 2, 3… used in the formulation of 
the model refer respectively to the number of agents included at each market stage.  
 
Perfectly competitive 
market 
 
.α β= −p Y ; .pYpi = ; ' 0ppi = = ; * 0p =  And *Y
α
β
=  
Under monopoly (sole 
agent): 
 
.pYpi = ; ( ).Y Ypi α β= − ; 2. .Y Ypi α β= − ; ' 2 . 0Ypi α β= − = ; 
*
2
Y
α
β
= and *
2
p α=  
Duopoly (2 agents): 
 
( )1 2p Y Yα β= − + ; ( )1 1 1 2 1pY Y Y Ypi α β= = − +    
( )2 2 1 2 2pY Y Y Ypi α β= = − +   ; 
'
1 1 22 . . 0Y Ypi α β β= − − =  
'
2 1 2. 2 . 0Y Ypi α β β= − − = ; the reaction functions are:  
2
1
2 2
Y
Y
α
β
= − ; 12
2 2
Y
Y
α
β
= − ; ( )*1 2
2
3
Y Y
α
β
+ =  And *
3
p α=  
Three agents: 
 
( )1 2 3p Y Y Yα β= − + + ; ( )1 1 1 2 3 1pY Y Y Y Ypi α β = = − + +  ; 
( )2 2 1 2 3 2pY Y Y Y Ypi α β = = − + +  ; 
( )3 3 1 2 3 3pY Y Y Y Ypi α β = = − + +  ; 
'
1 1 2 32 . . . 0Y Y Ypi α β β β= − − − = ; 
'
2 1 2 3. 2 . . 0Y Y Ypi α β β β= − − − = ;
'
3 1 2 3. . 2 . 0Y Y Ypi α β β β= − − − =  
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The reaction functions are then: 321
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Anti-commons with n 
agents: 
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i
i
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( )1
n
p
n
α
=
+
and *
(1 )
Y
n
α
β
=
+
; when n →∞ , then p α→  and 
0Y → . 
The above simplified model shows the expected outcomes from anti-commons (case with n 
operators). As shown in the last row of the above table, there is an under-use of resources with 
higher costs or prices when the number of operators becomes very large.   
The following empirical section is suggested for testing whether the process of enterprise 
creation in developing economies can be revealed to be under more fragmentation relative to the 
one pursuing by developed countries. This is achieved on the basis of the analysis of “doing 
business data”. The hypothesis to be tested is that under anti-commons, costs are expected to be 
higher and the outcomes (enterprise creation) lower.  
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III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF ANTI-COMMONS IN DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIES THROUGH ENTERPRISE CREATION 
The process of enterprise creation requires compliance with series of laws and regulations that 
are most of the time specific to every country and locations. Enterprise and business creation is 
thus subject to sets of authorizations and lengthy procedures. It is generally governed by an array 
of institutions that are likely to issue all the licenses needed for enterprise creation. These 
procedures usually reveal the existence of fragmented and scattered decision makers. Anti-
commons are likely to exist and may lead to the limitation of the number of enterprise to be 
created.  
The above features and hypotheses are tested in this section of this paper using the quantitative 
information provided by “Doing Business Data” and mainly the component that relates to 
starting a business.  
1. Variables,  Data and Observations 
Three sources of data are used. They include “Doing Business Report” (DBR), Transparency 
International and United Nations Development Program. These sources have provided 
respectively business data, corruption data and information on human development index. All 
these data pertain to 2010.  
Three variables are extracted from DBR. The first one relates to the number of procedures 
needed for enterprise creation. The second variable is “time” for the completion of the above 
procedures. The cost related to the creation of enterprises as a percentage of the country’s 
income per capita is the last variable.  
The corruption perception index (CPI) of 2010 is also used in this analysis. The human 
development index (HDI)
 3
 of 2010 has been useful in characterizing the level of development of 
countries (countries with larger HDI are more developed than the ones with lower HDI).  
The overall sample includes 154 countries that have data on starting a business, CPI and HDI. 
(See Appendix). 
2. Descriptive Statistics 
As shown in the 2010 DBR, the average number of procedures, time and cost are higher for 
different groups of developing countries in comparison with the data of the OECD economies 
(table 1). 
                                                 
3
 The HDI is an initiative of the United Nations Development Program launched in 1990. The HDI ranking is 
classifying countries into high and low development countries based on a HDI statistic. The latter is composed of 
life expectancy, education and standard of living data collected at the national level. In 2010, the methodology was 
changed slightly to include as usual the three dimensions: a long and healthy life style through Life Expectancy 
Index (at birth), Access to knowledge with an index including the Mean Years of Schooling Index and the Expected 
Years of Schooling Index, and a decent standard of living with the Income Index (a transformation of the Gross 
National Income) (United Nations Development Program, 2010) 
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Table 1: Number of Procedures, Time and Cost to Start a Business by Region (source: DBR, 2010) 
 Procedures (number) Time (days) Cost (% of income per capita) 
Latin America & Caribbean 9.3 56.7 36.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.9 45.2 95.4 
Middle East & North Africa 8.1 20 38 
East Asia & Pacific 7.8 39 27.1 
South Asia 7.1 24.6 24.5 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 6.3 16.3 8.5 
OECD 5.6 13.8 5.3 
The above observations are confirmed through the overall descriptive analysis of the detailed 
data. Tables 2, 3 and 4 below show the summary statistics for the variables “procedures”, “time”, 
and “cost” for the starting of business topic. These tables are based on the overall data (table 2) 
with the division of the overall sample in two equal size groups where developed countries have 
the highest HDI (table 3) and developing economies with the lowest HDI. (table 4). The 
following graph introduces a box-plot representation of the overall observations by variable. It 
provides information about the mean and the presence of outliers.  
Graph: Box-Plot representation of Data 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of Starting Business variables for all the countries 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
HDI 2010 154 .14 .9375 .6305 .1893 
CPI 2010 154 1.4 9.3 4.038 2.1304 
Procedures (number) 154 1 20 7.97 3.576 
Time (days) 154 1 216 31.98 35.671 
Cost (% of income per capita) 154 .0 847.6 44.451 88.7243 
      
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of Starting Business variables for High HDI countries 
 Procedures Time Cost 
Mean 6.58 19.50 5.58 
Standard Deviation 3.09 20.83 4.15 
Minimum 1 1 0 
Maximum 18.00 120.00 14.70 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of Starting Business variables for Low HDI countries 
 Procedures Time Cost 
Mean 9.17 50.36 77.67 
Standard Deviation 3.30 78.05 97.43 
Minimum 4 5 15 
Maximum 20.00 694.00 847.60 
 
When accounting for both the means and the standard deviations related to each variable and 
under a t-statistics test, high and low HDI countries exhibit statistically significant differences as 
shown in table 5. This implies that high HDI or developed countries exhibit statistically 
significant differences in the number of procedures, in time and costs relative to lower HDI or 
developing countries. Given the direction of these t-statistics values, developing economies show 
higher number of procedures, time and costs for enterprise creation.  
Table 5: t-tests of the 3 Variables between High and Low HDI Countries 
  Procedures Time Cost 
t-test 3.54 7.95 18.86 
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3. Regression analysis 
Regression analysis is conducted using the cost of enterprise creation as dependent variable. The 
independent variables are the number of procedures, the time required for business creation, the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and HDI. All the variables are under their logarithmic forms 
with the regression run on the overall available data and variables. Under this regression, a 
statistically non significance estimated coefficient for time is exhibited. Procedures and time 
have shown significant correlation (procedures=0.804+0.385*time with R
2
=0.541 and t-stat 
respectively of 8.869 and13.390). This has motivated the non inclusion of time in the final 
regression.  
The results of this regression are introduced in table 6. This table accounts also for 
multicollinearity tests through showing the values of the level of tolerance (tolerance) and the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) as in O’Brien (2007).  
Table 6 shows that with R
2 
= 0.669 and an overall high level of the F test, the statistically 
significant coefficients (or elasticities) at the 1% level are those for HDI 2010 (-2.831) and 
Procedures (1.140) while CPI 2010 (-0.593) has a statistically significance only at 5 %. No 
multicollinearity is observed as the tolerance is between 0.4 and 0.5 and VIF between 1.27 and 
2.20 (tolerance less than 0.20 or 0.10 and/or VIF of 5 or 10 and above for the existence of 
multicollinearity (O'Brien, 2007). 
Table 6: Regression results from the stage of “Creating a Business” 
 
R-Square 0.669 
R-Square Adj 0.662 
Standard Error of 
Estimate 
1.069 
F-test 101.1 
 
 Coefficient Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| Tolerance VIF 
Intercept -0.431 0.693 -0.622 0.534   
HDI 2010 -2.831 0.335 -8.431 0.001 0.533 1.876 
CPI 2010 -0.593 0.269 -2.204 0.029 0.450 2.198 
Procedures 1.140 0.190 5.978 0.001 0.787 1.270 
 
 
These results show that the costs of creating enterprises are sensitive to HDI, to the number of 
procedures and to CPI. The higher (respectively lower) is HDI, the lower (respectively higher) is 
the cost of enterprise creation. This implies that developed countries benefit from lower costs 
relative to developing economies that have higher costs. A 1 % increase (respectively decrease) 
in HDI generates 2.831 % cost decrease (respectively increase). Besides that, a 1 % increase 
(decrease) in procedures generates a 1.140 % increase (decrease) in costs. Besides that, a 1 % 
decrease (increase) in CPI implies a 0.593 % increase (decrease) in costs of enterprise creation. 
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Furthermore, when comparing the coefficients of HDI and procedures (t-test=-1587.86), the 
driving power of HDI appears to be higher. This confirms the role of development in the 
determining the costs.  
 
The higher costs in developing countries are indications of the existence of more fragmentation 
and that the probability of existence of anti-commons is higher in these countries in comparison 
with developed economies. This might be a signal of blockage of the creation of larger numbers 
of enterprises in the developing world. The access to market economies is thus lowered by the 
likely existence of anti-commons in less developed economies.  
 
IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Based on the outputs of these regressions, the number of procedures and the level of 
development represented by the human development index (HDI) appear to have significant 
effects on the costs of the enterprise creation. As higher HDI refers to higher level of 
development with lower values exhibited by developing economies, higher costs of enterprise 
creation are definitely expressed by developing countries. The higher values of procedures, time 
and costs are experienced in developing economies.  This shows how large numbers of 
procedures besides the time required are important signals for fragmentation and scattered 
decision makers. Fragmentation and high costs are consequently leading to the lowering of the 
probabilities of enterprise creation in less developed economies. A different situation is observed 
in developed countries where the costs are lower in relation to lower levels of fragmentation, 
meaning that lower probabilities of enterprise creation failure are expected relative to economies 
with higher costs. Fewer enterprises are consequently created in the less developed world as the 
consequence of the anti-commons related to the processes of authorizations and licensing. As 
private enterprises as major players in market economies, open market development is also under 
the effect of anti-commons. This is another difficulty that adds to the initial process of licensing 
and accessing to business ideas and technologies and also to the required patenting processes.  
The results of this paper are in conformity with those attained in previous studies. The paper on 
the business environment in Portugal by Silva et al. (2011) shows that the high number of 
institutions, the overlap of rights and the lack of coordination reduce the effectiveness of 
enterprise creation programs. The study by Djankov et al. (2002) finds other facets of rights 
fragmentation with regard to procedures and costs and those countries with high regulations and 
procedures have higher corruption and unofficial economies. This makes the costs even higher 
and limits enterprise creation.    
The implications from these results require that developing economies have to push further 
awareness about anti-commons besides issuing the needed remedies to reduce the negative 
effects of new technologies and institutional reforms. Some countries have accelerated the 
development of instruments devoted to the reduction of the negative impacts of the tragedy of 
anti-commons. China has focused on the administrative and institutional reforms as a step to 
consolidate government bodies with overlapping functions and coordinating their roles (Gao and 
Wang, 2008).   
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CONCLUSION 
As this paper looked to the anti-commons problem from the stand point of developing 
economies, an important emphasis has been placed first on showing how different authors have 
dealt with this question. Furthermore, cases have been used to underline the impacts of anti-
common on economic and social development. A special focus has been placed on the situation 
of developing economies, mainly in relation to the new issues raised by privatization, market 
development and enterprise expansion in the developing world. A simplified theoretical model 
has been used to underline the major features of anti-commons. It has retained that anti-
commons, as described in the literature, are characterized by the under use and the high price of 
the resource. The “Doing Business” data have been used to test empirically for the effects of 
anti-commons on enterprise creation. The results show that, in developing countries, as the 
number of procedures and also the required time for enterprise creation increase the related costs. 
The attained results confirm the validity of the theoretical model used but also the likelihood of 
the effects of anti-commons on market expansion in developing economies.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Country HDI 2010 CPI 2010 Procedures  Time  Cost  
Norway 0.93756098 8.6 5 7 1.9 
Australia 0.93731495 8.7 2 2 0.8 
New Zealand 0.90683008 9.3 1 1 0.4 
United States 0.90164638 7.1 6 6 0.7 
Ireland 0.89464218 8 4 13 0.3 
Netherlands 0.89020782 8.8 6 8 5.6 
Canada 0.88834718 8.9 1 5 0.4 
Sweden 0.88490513 9.2 3 15 0.6 
Germany 0.88489154 7.9 9 18 4.7 
Japan 0.88401773 7.8 8 23 7.5 
Korea (Republic of) 0.87716288 5.4 8 14 14.7 
Switzerland 0.87448954 8.7 6 20 2 
France 0.87239533 6.8 5 7 0.9 
Israel 0.87236108 6.1 5 34 4.2 
Finland 0.87086884 9.2 3 14 0.9 
Iceland 0.86859601 8.5 5 5 3 
Belgium 0.866787 7.1 3 4 5.3 
Denmark 0.86577208 9.3 4 6 0 
Spain 0.86344213 6.1 10 47 15 
Hong Kong, China (SAR) 0.86195195 8.4 3 6 1.8 
Greece 0.85491369 3.5 15 19 20.2 
Italy 0.85426524 3.9 6 10 17.9 
Luxembourg 0.85207224 8.5 6 24 1.8 
Austria 0.8510206 7.9 8 28 5.1 
United Kingdom 0.8489688 7.6 6 13 0.7 
Singapore 0.84610742 9.3 3 3 0.7 
Czech Republic 0.84145969 4.6 9 20 9.2 
Slovenia 0.82795668 6.4 3 6 0 
Slovakia 0.81844472 4.3 6 16 2 
United Arab Emirates 0.8152614 6.3 8 15 6.2 
Estonia 0.81189428 6.5 5 7 1.7 
Cyprus 0.81032291 6.3 6 8 11.7 
Hungary 0.80494561 4.7 4 4 8 
Qatar 0.80277523 7.7 6 6 7.1 
Bahrain 0.80090754 4.9 7 9 0.5 
Portugal 0.79489739 6 6 6 6.4 
Poland 0.79481787 5.3 6 32 17.9 
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Lithuania 0.78326858 5 7 26 2.4 
Chile 0.78278685 7.2 9 27 6.9 
Argentina 0.77544643 2.9 14 26 11 
Kuwait 0.77075883 4.5 13 35 1 
Latvia 0.76902262 4.3 5 16 2.1 
Montenegro 0.7686754 3.7 11 12 2.6 
Romania 0.76720951 3.7 6 10 2.9 
Croatia 0.76718421 4.1 7 22 8.4 
Uruguay 0.76543179 6.9 11 65 40 
Panama 0.75464179 3.6 6 12 10.3 
Saudi Arabia 0.7518336 4.7 4 5 7.7 
Mexico 0.75045017 3.1 8 13 11.7 
Malaysia 0.74388373 4.4 10 18 15.6 
Bulgaria 0.74320663 3.6 4 18 1.7 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.73557181 3.6 9 43 0.7 
Serbia 0.73521256 3.5 7 13 7.1 
Belarus 0.73200907 2.5 5 6 1.7 
Costa Rica 0.72495446 5.3 12 60 10.5 
Peru 0.72267996 3.5 9 41 17.2 
Albania 0.71871753 3.3 5 5 17 
Russian Federation 0.7186459 2.1 9 30 2.7 
Kazakhstan 0.71390432 2.9 7 20 4.8 
Azerbaijan 0.71289342 2.4 6 10 2.9 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.71038029 3.2 12 60 15.8 
Ukraine 0.70993365 2.4 10 27 5.8 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 0.70219756 2.2 7 9 3.9 
Macedonia, FYR 0.70120001 4.1 4 4 2.5 
Mauritius 0.70067684 5.4 5 6 4.1 
Brazil 0.69855934 3.7 16 120 6.9 
Georgia 0.6977196 3.8 3 3 3.7 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 0.69641804 2 16 141 24 
Armenia 0.69504847 2.6 6 15 2.6 
Ecuador 0.69501721 2.5 13 64 35.1 
Colombia 0.68884842 3.5 9 20 13.1 
Jamaica 0.68837504 3.3 6 8 5.3 
Tunisia 0.68252167 4.3 10 11 5.7 
Jordan 0.68085574 4.7 8 13 49.5 
Turkey 0.67866382 4.4 6 6 14.2 
Algeria 0.67709223 2.9 14 24 12.1 
Tonga 0.67663219 3 4 25 8.2 
Dominican Republic 0.66342845 3 8 19 17.3 
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China 0.6633773 3.5 14 38 4.9 
El Salvador 0.65939401 3.6 8 17 38.7 
Sri Lanka 0.65819326 3.2 4 38 5.9 
Thailand 0.65413152 3.5 7 32 6.3 
Gabon 0.6480172 2.8 9 58 17.8 
Bolivia 0.6426439 2.8 15 50 99.2 
Paraguay 0.63983757 2.2 7 35 56.7 
Philippines 0.63812958 2.4 16 53 28.7 
Botswana 0.6333996 5.8 10 61 2.1 
Moldova (Republic of) 0.62337802 2.9 8 10 7 
Mongolia 0.62198757 2.7 7 13 3 
Egypt 0.6197849 3.1 6 7 16.1 
Uzbekistan 0.61745856 1.6 7 15 11.2 
Guyana 0.61113201 2.7 8 34 18.6 
Namibia 0.60619857 4.4 10 66 20.4 
Honduras 0.60415904 2.4 13 14 47.3 
Indonesia 0.59992869 2.8 9 60 26 
Kyrgyzstan 0.59838474 2 3 11 5.2 
South Africa 0.59744047 4.5 6 22 5.9 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.5889619 2.5 7 15 27.8 
Tajikistan 0.57974909 2.1 12 38 24.3 
Viet Nam 0.57198959 2.7 11 50 13.3 
Morocco 0.56665912 3.4 6 12 16.1 
Nicaragua 0.56515746 2.5 6 39 111.7 
Guatemala 0.56004394 3.2 12 37 47.8 
Equatorial Guinea 0.53807711 1.9 20 136 100.4 
Cape Verde 0.53381169 5.1 9 24 17 
India 0.51913857 3.3 13 30 66.1 
Swaziland 0.49794002 3.2 12 60 33.9 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 0.49681968 2.1 7 100 12.3 
Solomon Islands 0.49419705 2.8 7 57 52.7 
Cambodia 0.49374351 2.1 9 85 138.4 
Pakistan 0.49028472 2.3 10 21 5.8 
Congo 0.48892062 2.1 10 160 86.5 
Sao Tome and Principe 0.48764851 3 10 144 81.7 
Kenya 0.47009393 2.1 12 34 36.5 
Bangladesh 0.46925518 2.4 7 44 36.2 
Ghana 0.46719727 4.1 7 12 24.8 
Cameroon 0.45977278 2.2 10 35 115 
Yemen 0.43946881 2.2 6 12 83 
Benin 0.43529881 2.8 7 31 155.5 
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Madagascar 0.43472753 2.6 2 7 6.2 
Mauritania 0.43348152 2.3 9 19 34.7 
Papua New Guinea 0.43143452 2.1 6 51 18.9 
Nepal 0.42845613 2.2 7 31 53.6 
Togo 0.42814256 2.4 7 75 205 
Comoros 0.42760621 2.1 11 24 182.1 
Lesotho 0.42714913 3.5 7 40 27 
Nigeria 0.42269848 2.4 8 31 76.7 
Uganda 0.42157619 2.5 18 25 84.4 
Senegal 0.41110506 2.9 4 8 63.7 
Haiti 0.40404657 2.2 13 195 204 
Angola 0.40308219 1.9 8 68 151.1 
Djibouti 0.40199581 3.2 11 37 195.1 
Tanzania (United Republic of) 0.39825364 2.7 12 29 36.8 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.39684391 2.2 10 40 133.3 
Zambia 0.39487866 3 6 18 28.4 
Gambia 0.39013264 3.2 8 27 215.1 
Rwanda 0.38540038 4 2 3 10.1 
Malawi 0.38472155 3.4 10 39 108 
Sudan 0.37873261 1.6 10 36 36 
Afghanistan 0.34924878 1.4 4 7 30.2 
Guinea 0.34017239 2 13 41 139.2 
Ethiopia 0.32822107 2.7 5 9 18.9 
Sierra Leone 0.31747491 2.4 6 12 118.8 
Central African Republic 0.31509695 2.1 8 22 244.9 
Mali 0.30939489 2.7 6 8 86.9 
Burkina Faso 0.30506259 3.1 4 14 50.3 
Liberia 0.29992748 3.3 5 20 52.9 
Chad 0.29480582 1.7 13 75 246.4 
Guinea-Bissau 0.28872206 2.1 16 216 181.5 
Mozambique 0.28431741 2.7 10 26 19.3 
Burundi 0.28150355 1.8 11 32 151.6 
Niger 0.26135128 2.6 9 17 118.7 
Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 0.23909499 2 14 127 847.6 
Zimbabwe 0.14007917 2.4 9 97 353.8 
 
 
